A — The Facts
From a distance, the situation looks almost improbable: Venezuela stabilizes, the United States re-engages, flights resume, oil flows, and the language of diplomacy quietly replaces that of confrontation.
It feels like peace. But it is not. What has emerged is something far more precise — and far more fragile: a negotiated contract between asymmetrical actors, bound not by trust, but by necessity.
The turning point was not diplomatic. It was kinetic.
The capture of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026 by United States forces did not dismantle the system. It forced it to reconfigure under pressure. What followed was not regime change in the classical sense. It was regime adaptation.
Delcy Rodríguez — not an outsider, but a core insider — stepped into continuity rather than rupture. Within weeks, the United States formally recognized her authority, lifted sanctions targeting her personally, and reopened diplomatic channels. At the same time, something deeper was set in motion.
The United States Treasury authorized broad transactions with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), effectively reopening the oil economy — but under new rules. Those rules define the contract.
They are simple in structure, but complex in implication:
- Venezuela regains access to global markets — but not full control
- Oil production resumes — but under externally conditioned frameworks
- Revenues flow — but through monitored financial channels
- Political legitimacy is granted — but contingent on continued alignment
The financial architecture is explicit: revenues from oil exports are routed through United States-supervised accounts or controlled funds, with oversight on how proceeds are spent.
In parallel, transactions are restricted to companies operating under specific United States licenses, effectively filtering who can participate in the Venezuelan energy market.
This is not sovereignty restored. It is sovereignty re-engineered. Even the legal architecture reflects this shift.
In January 2026, Venezuela adopted sweeping hydrocarbon reforms allowing private and foreign companies to operate fields, receive revenues, and negotiate production terms — reversing key elements of the Chávez-era state control model.
Major international actors — including Chevron, Shell, BP, Eni, and Repsol — were authorized to resume or expand operations, under United States licensing conditions and financial supervision. At the same time, previously signed contracts under the Maduro administration were suspended or reviewed, signaling a reset of the contractual landscape under external influence.
Oil exports, after collapsing under sanctions and blockade conditions, have rebounded sharply, with volumes rising again toward global markets — but through controlled channels and selected intermediaries.
Simultaneously, political gestures — including the release of hundreds of prisoners — signal compliance and reduce external pressure, without fundamentally altering internal power structures.
Operational reality, however, remains fragile: refineries operate at roughly one-third of capacity, infrastructure remains degraded, and the system depends on imported inputs such as naphtha to sustain production.
Seen from within Venezuela, this may feel like relief. Seen from Washington, it is stabilization.
Seen structurally, it is something else entirely:
- A system where power has not disappeared — it has changed form.
- The currency of this system is not ideology.
- It is oil, access, and control over flows.
And as long as those flows remain aligned, the system holds.
B — The breaking points beneath the surface
This arrangement is stable only as long as its internal tensions remain contained. There are several clear fault lines — each capable of disrupting the equilibrium.
1. The revenue control paradox
At the heart of the agreement lies a contradiction:
- Venezuela needs financial autonomy to rebuild
- The United States requires financial oversight to maintain leverage
- Oil revenues are already routed through controlled or supervised mechanisms tied to United States licensing conditions.
This creates a structural tension:
The more Venezuela stabilizes, the stronger its incentive to reclaim control. The more control it reclaims, the weaker the United States leverage becomes.
This is not a temporary issue. It is a built-in instability.
2. The contract uncertainty problem
Investors are waiting. Despite political momentum, the new oil contract frameworks remain unclear, delaying large-scale investment decisions.
This reveals a second fragility:
- The system promises openness
- But has not yet fully defined its rules
Without legal clarity, capital hesitates. Without capital, recovery slows. Without recovery, political pressure returns.
3. The elite continuity risk
The same networks remain in place. Rodríguez is not a break with the past — she is a continuation under new constraints. Institutional structures associated with repression have not been fully dismantled, according to international observers.
This creates a latent tension:
- External actors seek reform
- Internal actors seek preservation
If reform moves too far, internal resistance may emerge. If reform stalls, external support may weaken.
4. The geopolitical exclusion line
The agreement implicitly redraws Venezuela’s external alignments.
United States licensing structures restrict engagement with actors such as China, Russia, and Iran.
This introduces a strategic pressure point:
- Venezuela historically relied on diversified partnerships
- The new system narrows that field
If alternative partners re-enter — or if the United States overplays its leverage — the alignment could fracture.
5. The social expectation gap
Economic normalization creates expectations. Wage increases, reopening flights, and renewed activity signal recovery.
But:
- Inflation remains high
- Infrastructure remains degraded
- Living standards remain fragile
If expectations rise faster than reality improves, social pressure could re-enter the system from below.
6. The origin problem (legitimacy)
The entire arrangement is rooted in a contested beginning:
- The removal of Maduro involved a United States military operation
- International reactions included concerns about sovereignty violations
This matters because: Legitimacy is not only legal — it is narrative.
As long as this origin remains unresolved, the system carries a latent legitimacy deficit.
Closing reflection
What we are observing is not a reconciliation of adversaries. It is a temporary alignment of interests under constraint.
It works because:
- Oil flows
- Money circulates
- Power adapts
But beneath that surface lies a more fundamental reality: The system holds not because it is resolved — but because, for now, it is mutually useful. And that is always conditional.
Synthesis
The current United States–Venezuela relationship is a transactional stabilization framework, centered on oil, financial control, and geopolitical alignment. It appears peaceful, but is structurally fragile due to unresolved tensions in sovereignty, legitimacy, and economic control.
C — USA vs. Venezuela – Iran and its Proxies: a comparison
At first glance, the two systems appear fundamentally different.
Venezuela represents a state re-integrating into the global order under external constraints.
Iran represents a state projecting power outward through indirect networks.
But beneath that surface, both reveal variations of the same structural phenomenon: Power exercised through systems, not through direct control.
1. Two models of external influence
The Venezuelan case is built on centralized contractual control. The United States engages directly with the state, reshaping its economic architecture through:
- Financial supervision
- Licensing regimes
- Controlled access to global markets
- The system remains vertically structured. Authority is concentrated. Control flows through institutions.
The Iranian model follows a different logic. It is decentralized and network-based. Instead of direct control over a single state, Iran operates through a constellation of aligned actors:
- Hezbollah in Lebanon
- Militias in Iraq and Syria
- Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza
- The Houthis in Yemen
These actors are not identical copies of Iranian power. They are extensions with autonomy. Iran does not control a system. It orchestrates an ecosystem.
2. Control vs. influence
The Venezuelan framework is explicit. Control is visible:
- Financial flows are monitored
- Contracts are conditioned
- Market access is filtered
The architecture is legal, traceable, and institutional.
The Iranian proxy model is opaque. Influence is distributed:
- Funding, training, and weapons flow through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) networks
- Operational decisions are often localized
- Plausible deniability is built into the system
Even within the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” autonomy persists. Some groups act in alignment, others selectively, depending on local conditions and survival logic. This creates a paradox:
Less direct control, but greater strategic flexibility
3. Stability mechanisms
The Venezuelan arrangement stabilizes through interdependence. It works because:
- Oil flows benefit both sides
- Financial oversight maintains leverage
- Political continuity reduces internal disruption
Stability is engineered through mutual usefulness.
The Iranian system stabilizes through redundancy and dispersion.
- If one node weakens, others remain active.
- If pressure increases in one theater, it shifts to another.
This creates a form of resilience: Not stable in appearance, but durable in structure. Iran’s network has been built precisely to absorb pressure and continue operating across multiple fronts
4. Outcomes
The Venezuelan trajectory leads toward:
- Economic normalization (conditional)
- Partial reintegration into global markets
- Persistent external oversight
The system becomes:
Predictable. Structured, but constrained.
The Iranian proxy model leads toward:
- Persistent regional instability
- Distributed confrontation zones
- Continuous low-intensity conflict
The system becomes:
Adaptive, ambiguous, and difficult to neutralize
5. Risks and fault lines
Both models carry internal contradictions.
Venezuela — the sovereignty tension
The more the system stabilizes, the stronger the incentive to reclaim autonomy. But reclaiming autonomy weakens the external structure that enables stability. This creates a built-in fracture point.
Iran — the control dilution problem
The broader the proxy network becomes, the harder it is to control. Autonomy increases. Alignment becomes conditional. What begins as influence can evolve into divergence.
6. The deeper convergence
Despite their differences, both systems point in the same direction:
A transformation in how power is exercised.
- Venezuela demonstrates how sovereignty can be reshaped through financial architecture
- Iran demonstrates how power can be projected through networked actors
In both cases, direct control is replaced by control over flows:
Money, energy, weapons, influence.
The battlefield is no longer defined by territory alone. It is defined by the ability to structure and redirect systems.
Closing reflection
The Venezuelan model seeks stability through structure. The Iranian model sustains influence through fragmentation.
One reduces uncertainty by tightening control. The other survives uncertainty by distributing it.
Both, however, operate within the same emerging reality:
Power no longer needs to be visible to be effective.
Venezuela and Iran’s proxy system represent two distinct models of modern power:
centralized contractual control vs. decentralized network influence.
While different in form, both rely on indirect mechanisms and reveal a broader shift toward system-based power structures.
© Robert F. Tjón, April 10, 2026
Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International
This piece first appeared on Substack. I republish it here voluntarily — not as repetition, but as trace; a place where words can rest after their first flight.
